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Abstract 
This paper examines country specific herding behavior in European liquid constituent 
indices for the period of 2001-2012. While we report insignificant results for the whole 
period, we document significant herding behavior during crises and asymmetric market 
conditions. Particularly, herding effect is pronounced in most continental countries during 
the global financial crisis and Nordic countries during the Eurozone crisis. However, PIIGS 
countries are the victims in both crises. Furthermore, we find evidence that the cross 
sectional dispersions of returns can be partly explained by the cross sectional dispersions of 
the other markets, with Germany having the greatest influence on the regional cross-country 
herding effect. Apprehensions heighten among the regulators, policy makers, and investors 
in the European markets for the herding behavior during volatile market conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of several widespread crises, herd behavior in financial markets has 
emerged as a relatively popular topic in the financial literature. Scholars stress that 
herd behavior by market participants aggravates market volatility and leads to 
market instability (see Shiller, 1990; Eichengreen et al., 1998; Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber, 1999; Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Morris and Shin, 1999; and Persaud, 2000) 2. 
Academics who map herding effects by empirically testing theoretical models can be 
classified into two main groups: first, researchers testing with aggregate market data 
analysis (e.g., Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang et al., 2000; Hwang and Salmon, 
2004; and Wang, 2008) and, second, researchers using data analysis for portfolio 
investors (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999; Trueman, 1994; Welch, 2000; 
and Walter and Weber, 2006). Our study is based on the former group and includes 
major developed European markets3.  
However, research on herd behavior is widely applied to emerging markets, only a 
few studies focus on developed markets (and provides controversial findings)4. In 
addition, the literature on asymmetric market conditions and their impact on herding 
in developed markets are not well-researched compared to emerging markets (e.g., 
Chiang and Zheng (2010). Our study focus on the comparative analysis of herding in 
                                                        
2 Herding behavior is more pronounced during periods of turmoil than during periods of stability. Christie and 
Huang (1995) stress in their paper that a “herd” is more likely to form under conditions of market stress, when 
individual investors tend to suppress their own beliefs (cascades) and follow the market consensus. 
 
3 We consider only selected developed European countries including the sovereign affected PIIGS (Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) countries and we do not, therefore, include emerging Europe in the study. 
 
4 Christie and Haung (1995) and Baur (2006) find no evidence of herding in developed markets. In contrast, 
Chiang and Zheng (2010), and Economou et al. (2011) find evidence of a significant herding effect in the 
developed markets. 
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the European stock markets, which is closely related to the study done by Economou 
et al., (2011) and Chiang and Zheng, (2010) but we include Ireland and Nordic 
countries in our sample and consider most liquid constituent indices in our data set.  
Our study contributes to the field of study in three ways. First, we focus on the 
comparative analysis of herding in the European stock markets considering the 
liquid constituent indices in each country – this helps us to focus more on crisis 
aspects. We also argue that the sample selection processes, especially the selection of 
indices by Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Economou et al. (2011), are critical because 
of their limited ability to separate the impacts of crises and other constraints. 
Economou et al. (2011) consider all listed stocks (including active and dead stocks) of 
four PIGS market, while Cheng and Zheng (2010) consider all firms industry price 
indices of 18 advanced and emerging markets. We consider the actively traded 
individual firm level data and actively traded stock (liquid constituent) indices of 11 
developed European stock markets. As we know that herding might be due to a 
series of market frictions, such as liquidity black holes, arbitrage opportunity as well 
as investors’ behavioral biases lead to market conditions that can be ex-post 
characterized as irrational (Brunnermeier, 2001; Shlefier, 2000). Our sample, which 
differs from previous studies [Chang and Zheng, 2010; Economou et al., 2011], can 
help test the separate effect of crisis and market sentiment rather than herding due to 
information asymmetry and market microstructures. However, deterioration of 
investor’s sentiment such as panic (Philippas et al., 2013) during crises might 
contribute significantly to the emergence of herding behavior. In recent years there 
has been significant debate about contagion and herding even in developed open 
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economies (Chari and Kehoe, 2004; Corsetti et al., 2005; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; and 
Park and Sabourian, 2011). The updated literature on market efficiency has shifted 
from the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) that states that the level of market 
efficiency remains unchanged in a complete sense during the estimation period to 
advocating the possibility of time-varying efficiency or inefficiency5. Although it is 
important to distinguish between intentional herding and spurious herding in 
theory, it is difficult to separate them in practice. The reason for this difficulty is that 
there are many factors that influence investment decisions (Bikhchandani and 
Sharma, 2001, p.281). Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) suggest that a group may 
privilege herding behavior if it is sufficiently homogeneous, given that every 
member is confronted with similar decisions and they can observe each other’s 
transactions. Moreover, liquidity constraints, asymmetric information, limits to 
arbitrage (Shleifer, 2000; Brunnermier, 2001; and Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) pose a 
constant threat to financial stability exposing market participants and financial 
institutions to unhedgeable systematic risk (Economou et al., 2011). Furthermore, it is 
frequently argued that financial crises are a result of widespread herding among 
market participants that can be explained better by behavioral finance theory, that 
demands consideration of irrationality (such as panic) with the fundamentals.  Our 
sample is free from non-synchronous stocks, that relief us to disregard the bias of 
information asymmetry and lack of arbitrage opportunity. We argue that our sample 
is able to capture investor’s sentiment during crises since our sample is free from 
                                                        
5 The latter approach has recently been gaining attention (e.g., Lo, 2004 and 2005; Yen and Lee (2008); Ito and 
Sugiyama, 2009; and Lim and Brooks, 2011). However, Lo (2004 and 2005) suggest that the new paradigm of an 
adaptive markets hypothesis (AMH), according to which the EMH may persist together with behavioral finance 
in a logically consistent way. 
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other causes of herding such as herding due to liquidity constraints, asymmetric 
information, limits to arbitrage. 
Second, we include continental Europe, the Nordic countries and the PIIGS 
altogether in our sample and this helps us focus on the comparative analysis of 
herding in the European stock markets. Chiang and Zheng (2010) analyzed herd 
behavior among globally selected markets with little attention to Europe, and 
Economou et al. (2011) analyzed herd behavior with the selected European (the 
PIGS) countries only. We further assume that different groups of countries in Europe 
might not herd in the same way in Europe across two different crises periods. More 
specifically, our paper contributes to the comparative analysis of herd behavior 
among developed European countries6, where the empirical evidence is limited7. 
Europe has suffered from austerity following the Eurozone sovereign crisis in the 
PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) countries and a key aspect of the 
monetary integration in Europe is the need for the European Union to take 
responsibility for all countries regardless of economic status/performance. The 
context is further complicated by the Nordic countries being different from the 
continental European countries (which are similar in nature in terms of legal regimes, 
corporate governance, ownership structures and macroeconomic environments). By 
critically analyzing the study of Holmes et al. (2013) for Portugal and Economou et 
al. (2011) for the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain), we assume that the herd 
behavior is common in Southern Europe. However, the cross-country correlation of 
                                                        
6 Continental European countries (e.g., France and Germany), the sovereign infected countries (e.g., The PIIGS-
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), and Nordic countries (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway). 
 
7 Economou et al. (2011) consider only four countries (the PIGS- Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) and do not 
investigate the impact of the Eurozone crisis. 
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dispersion of return among the European countries during two consecutives crises is 
an interesting addition of this paper.  
 
Finally, our study stresses on the cross-country herding effect during the Eurozone 
crisis (EZC), whereas the sample period ends in 2008 for Chiang and Zheng (2010) 
and in 2009 for Economou et al. (2011). We argue that the PIIGS countries, which 
were severely affected during the global financial crisis (GFC), might contaminate 
the adverse economic and financial shocks (e.g., Karolyi and Stulz, 1996; Bae et al., 
2003; and Chandar et al., 2009) from local to foreign markets via different economic 
channels during the recent crises.  This might be also due to fact that investors are 
more likely to follow the herd and suppress their private information during 
financial turmoil. Our paper contributes to the extant literature by analyzing herd 
behavior among European countries for a period that includes the GFC and EZC.  
The major findings of our study suggest that, in general, herding effects are almost 
insignificant in Europe under normal conditions. However, we find significant 
herding in asymmetric market conditions and crises periods. The empirical evidence 
suggests a significant herding effect during the GFC in continental and PIIGS 
markets as compared to Nordic markets; with the Nordic markets being more 
affected during the EZC. We also find that the German market has the greatest 
influence on the regional cross-country herding effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
hypotheses and reviews the related literature, while Section 3 presents the 
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methodology and data. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 offers 
conclusions. 
2. Hypotheses Development and Related Literature 
Herding in financial markets has been typically described as the tendency of market 
participants to mimic the action of others. This collective investment behavior is said 
to be strongest during extreme market conditions, when market volatility and 
information flows impede the reliability and accuracy of investment predictions. As 
a result, investors are more likely to disregard their private information and search 
for the market-wide consensus, which is seen as a cost-efficient solution compared to 
the cost of gathering reliable information during a volatile period (Christie and 
Huang, 1995). In addition, it might be due to the fact that following the herd 
generates at least the average market return (Gleason et al., 2004). In brief, the 
underlying causes of this behavior are portrayed as being either ‘rational’ (i.e., the 
investor follows the majority believing that they possess superior information or 
analytical skills) or ‘irrational’ (i.e., the investor acts without any rational 
consideration) (see Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
The empirical literature utilizing the market-wide approach focuses on the cross-
sectional correlations of the entire stock market and this is the primary focus of our 
study. A pioneering study in this area is that of Christie and Huang (1995), who, 
utilizing the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns (CSSD) as a measure of the 
average proximity of individual asset returns to the realized market average, 
introduced an econometric method to detect herd behavior. Chang et al. (2000) 
extend the model proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) by using a non-linear 
regression specification. Their results show no evidence of herding on the part of 
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market participants in the US and Hong Kong, but offer partial evidence of herding 
in Japan. However, during periods of extreme price movements, equity return 
dispersions for developed countries tend to increase rather than decrease, providing 
strong evidence against any market-wide herding, which is consistent with Christie 
and Huang (1995). However, for South Korea and Taiwan, the two emerging markets 
in their sample, they document significant evidence of herding. Further, Gleason et 
al. (2004) use intraday data to examine whether traders herd during periods of 
extreme market movements using sector Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). 
Implementing the methods of Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) and 
analyzing up and down markets, they report no evidence of herding. They also 
report a weak presence of an asymmetric reaction to news during periods of stress in 
up markets and down markets. They also find that investors respond to bad news 
quickly with a higher incentive to mimic the market, which indicates that market 
participants may fear the potential loss from a down market during the period of 
stress more than they might enjoy the potential gains from an up market during the 
period of stress. Similarly, using high frequency data on the Australian market, 
Henker et al. (2006) find no evidence of herding towards market portfolios. In 
addition, even in extreme market conditions, participants seem to have a high level 
of firm-specific information. The use of daily data in this type of study was first 
motivated by Caporale et al. (2008) and also supported by Tan et al. (2008). 
Economou et al. (2011) examine whether the cross-sectional dispersion of returns in 
one market is affected by the cross-sectional dispersion in the other three markets. 
They find evidence of a strong co-movement between the cross-sectional dispersions 
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of the four stock markets, indicating that the portfolio diversification benefits are 
rather small considering these markets in the presence of herding. Their results 
confirm the presence of market-wide herding in the Portugal Italian and Greek stock 
markets, as already shown by Caparrelli et al. (2004) and Caporale et al. (2008).  In 
this context, the current study addresses the issues around cross-country herd 
behavior, especially investigating the Eurozone spillover of herding across European 
markets.  
We assume that different markets in Europe are not at the same level in terms of 
informational dissemination and transparency with heterogeneous firms or industry 
structures. We have conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis applying Dandrograms 
(see Figure 1) using both market returns (Rm) and CSAD data for eleven markets in 
our sample. Dandrogram reports show the ranking of sample countries in terms of 
median linkage variances. We divide our sample into three country groups based on 
these diagrams. The country groups are: the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain), the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden), 
and continental countries (France and Germany). We find that continental countries 
are ranked 1-2, the PIIGS countries are ranked 3-7, and the Nordic countries are 
ranked 8-11. We assume that herding behavior within each panel group might be 
similar due to similar characteristics in terms of market microstructure and 
information dissemination processes. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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We further expect a heterogeneous pattern of herd behavior among the three groups 
according to the wakeup call hypothesis. The wakeup call hypothesis (Goldstein, 
1998) argues that market participants wake up after a crisis and considers that similar 
market fundamentals between markets (i.e., the same level of market transparency 
and industrial structure) leads to similar market behaviors. In addition, countries 
with weak macroeconomic fundamentals are vulnerable to the propagation of 
financial crises. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, some studies (e.g., 
Bekaert et al., 2011) have found contagion from countries with similar characteristics 
as a complement to the wakeup call hypothesis. Thus, our first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H1: There is a herding effect among the European stock markets for the entire sample period. 
We expect, however, that country-wise herding affects are not similar among the 
continental, Nordic and PIIGS countries for the entire sample period. Another aspect 
of studying herd behavior focuses on the scattering of the cross-sectional correlation 
of stock returns in response to disproportionately changing market conditions. While 
investigating the information asymmetry in stock markets, researchers (Tan et al., 
2008; Chiang and Zheng 2010; and Economou et al., 2011) have predicted that 
investors in financial markets are more likely to exhibit herd behavior. For countries 
with different regimes of boom, bust and market asymmetry within a long sample 
period, herd behavior may arise differently across different country groups because 
of differences in geographic and cultural heritage and information asymmetry. This 
leads us to test the asymmetry of the market up and down, with positive and 
negative returns signaling good news and bad news, high and low volume, volatility 
etc. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
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H2: Herd behavior responds differently to asymmetry in market conditions across different 
country groups in Europe.  
This hypothesis investigates the herd behavior around market asymmetry, but we 
divide H2 into three sub-hypotheses to capture asymmetric market conditions of 
rising and falling markets (H2a), higher and lower volume (H2b) and higher and 
lower volatility (H2c), respectively. 
 
In addition, herd behavior is a key phenomenon to examine and document from both 
regulatory and investment perspectives. As noted earlier, it is well known that 
similar sub-groups of European countries may have similar institutional, cultural, 
economic and financial linkages, which differ among different groups of markets. 
This observation motivates us to test our third hypothesis as follows: 
H3: There is cross-country herd behavior between different country groups. 
Finally, the herd behavior in foreign markets during the global crisis (e.g., Economou 
et al., 2011) raises a research issue for the European countries because the Eurozone 
crisis devastated the European countries. Country-wise herding behavior might be 
influenced by foreign markets in addition to domestic markets due to flights to 
quality (see Allen and Gale, 2000), portfolio rebalancing (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2005; and Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), liquidity channels, risk 
premium channels under the contagion literature (Longstaff, 2010), and cross listing 
effects, (Chandar et al., 2009). Further, in periods of market turbulence, herd behavior 
may pose a threat to financial stability because initial negative shocks may be 
exacerbated and amplified via pro-cyclical market mechanisms, which leads us to 
our final hypothesis as follows: 
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H4: Country-wise herd behavior changes during the GFC and the EZC. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Basis of Estimation Procedure: 
We use daily stock returns of constituent stocks for a panel of European Stock 
markets to measure return dispersion via the cross sectional absolute deviations. 
Chang et al. (2000) argue that a linear and increasing relation between dispersion and 
market returns, as suggested by standard asset pricing models, does not hold in 
times of large average price movements. Thus, herd behavior around the market 
consensus during periods of large price movements is sufficient for converting the 
linear relation into a non-linear one. To capture this effect, we estimate the cross-
sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) as a measure of return dispersion8, which was 
implemented by Chang et al. (2000), as follows:  
    (1) 
where, Ri,t is the observed stock return of asset i at time t and Rm,t is the cross-
sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market portfolio at time t. The 
non-linear framework for modeling the relationship between individual stock return 
dispersions and the market average is specified as follows: 
   (2) 
where, Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market 
portfolio at time t, the squared market return (R2m,t) is used to capture the non-
linearity in the relationship,  is the constant, 1, and 2 are coefficients, and t is the 
error term at time t. We use the Newey-West (1987) estimator to obtain 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) co-variances for all the 
                                                        
8 CSAD is free from the outlier problem (Economou et al., 2011) as compared to CSSD that is measured by 
Christie and Huang (1995). 

CSADt 
1
N
Ri,t  Rm,t
i1
N


CSADt  1Rm,t  2Rm,t
2  t
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ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. This model is implemented to test H1 and 
Eq. (3), which is estimated for each country (i). In the absence of herding effects, Eq. 
(3) assumes 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. But herding effects are present if 2 < 0 (negatively 
significant).  
We mainly follow Economou et al. (2011), who apply the Chang et al., (2000) model 
called CCK later in this paper using the PIGS sample. Further, we also use Chiang 
and Zheng’s (2010) extended model for robustness checking - they applied the model 
in the developed markets and included the market return along with the absolute 
and squared market return to reduce the misspecification error.  
However, since the relationship between CSAD and market returns may be 
asymmetric, we further examine whether herd behavior is more pronounced when 
market returns, trading volumes, and return volatility are high. We follow the 
approach of Chiang and Zheng (2010), who utilize a dummy variable approach in a 
single model, which is considered to be more robust than that of Tan et al. (2008).  
We test H2 separately for returns, volume and volatility using Eq. (3-5). The 
asymmetric behavior of return dispersion with respect to market returns is estimated 
as follows: 
 (3) 
where, Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market 
portfolio at time t, the squared market return (Rm,t)2 is used to capture the non-
linearity in the relationship, Dup is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for days with 
positive market returns and a value of 0 for days with negative market returns,  is 
the constant, 1, 2, 3, 4 are coefficients and t is the error term at time t. In the 

CSADi,t   1D
up Rm,t   2(1D
up)Rm,t   3D
up(Rm,t )
2
                 4 (1D
up)(Rm,t )
2  t
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absence of herding effects, Eq. (3) assumes 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. This model is 
implemented to test H2 (a). Herding effects are present if 3 < 0 and 4 < 0, with 4 < 3 
if these effects are more pronounced during days with negative market returns. 
Furthermore, the asymmetric behavior of return dispersions with respect to trading 
volume can be estimated as follows: 
 (4) 
where, Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market 
portfolio at time t, the squared market return (Rm,t)2 is used to capture the non-
linearity in the relationship, DVol-High is 1 for days with a high trading volume and 0 
otherwise,  is the constant, 1, 2, 3, 4 are coefficients and t is the error term at time 
t. The trading volume on day t is regarded as high if it is greater than the previous 
30-day moving average and low if it is lower than the previous 30-day moving 
average. In the absence of herding effects, Eq. (4) assumes 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. This 
model is used to test H2(b). Herding effects are present if 3 < 0 and 4 < 0, with 3 < 4 
if these effects are more pronounced during days with a high trading volume. 
The asymmetric behavior of return dispersion with respect to market volatility is 
estimated as follows: 
 (5) 
where, Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market 
portfolio at time t, the squared market return (Rm,t)2 is used to capture the non-
linearity in the relationship, D2-High is 1 for days with high market volatility and 0 
otherwise,  is the constant, 1, 2, 3, 4 are coefficients and t is the error term at time 

CSADi,t   1D
VolHigh Rm,t   2(1D
VolHigh)Rm,t
                 3D
VolHigh(Rm,t )
2   4 (1D
VolHigh)(Rm,t )
2  t

CSADi,t   1D
 2 High Rm,t  2(1D
 2 High)Rm,t
                3D
 2 High(Rm,t )
2  4 (1D
 2 High)(Rm,t )
2  t
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t. Market volatility on day t is regarded as high if it is greater than the previous 30-
day moving average and low if it is lower than the previous 30-day moving average. 
In the absence of herding effects, Eq. (5) assumes 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. This model is 
applied to test H2(c). Herding effects are present if 3 < 0 and 4 < 0, with 3 < 4 if these 
effects are more pronounced during days with high market volatility. 
 
In addition, markets that exhibit a certain degree of co-movement with correlated 
cross-sectional return dispersions are also likely to show synchronized herding 
patterns to test H3. Following Economou et al. (2011), Eq. (2) is modified by adding 
explanatory variables for the cross-sectional dispersions of the N markets included in 
our sample as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (6)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
where, Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market 
portfolio at time t, the squared market return (Rm,t)2 is used to capture the non-
linearity in the relationship,  is the constant, 1, 2 are coefficients, j is the CSAD 
coefficient for other countries (j), and t is the error term at time t. The cross-country 
herding effects are present if j<0. 
 
Finally, this paper also examines whether herding effects are more pronounced 
during periods of financial crises. This model tests H4. For the empirical testing, a 
dummy variable,D
CRISIS
, that is 1 for days of crisis and 0 otherwise is added to the 
benchmark Eq. (3) as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡=𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2 + 𝛾3𝐷
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2 + 𝜀𝑡            (7) 
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where, Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of the N returns in the aggregate market 
portfolio at time t, the squared market return (Rm,t)2 is used to capture the non-
linearity in the relationship,  is the constant, 1, 2, 3 are coefficients, and t is the 
error term at time t. We test Eq. (7) using both GFC and EZC dummies separately. If 
herding effects are more pronounced during the crises periods and differ among 
country groups, the crises coefficients ‘3’ in both crises should be greater than 0. 
 
3.2 Data 
The data set is constructed from the most liquid constituent shares of the main 
indices of Germany (DAX-30), France (CAC-40), Portugal (PSI-20), Italy (FTSE-MIB), 
Ireland (ISEQ), Greece (ATHEX Composite), Spain (IBEX-35), Sweden (OMXS-30), 
Norway (OSLO OBX), Denmark (OMXC-20) and Finland (OMXH-25). These are the 
market capitalization weighted index traded in the continuous market. The sample 
period stretches from 01-01-2001 to 16-02-2012. Daily returns for the constituent firms 
are calculated as follows: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
) × 100. The constructed market portfolio 
return

Rm,t , which is needed to calculate the CSAD measure in Eq. (1), is equally 
weighted. The Thomson Data stream was used to retrieve stock prices and 
Bloomberg for trading volumes. The GFC and EZC periods are identified as 09 
August 2007-31st December 2009 and 02 May 2010-16 February 20129. There are more 
than 2900 daily observations for each country from 2001 to 2012. 
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                        
9 Since BNP Paribas ceased all its banking operations on the 9th August, 2007, we consider this date as the 
beginning of GFC. However, by following Ahmed et al. (2012), we set 31st December 2009 as the end date for the 
GFC. Further, Greece gets its first bailout money on the 2nd May, 2010, which is considered as the beginning of 
Eurozone crisis. However, our data point ends on the 16th February, 2012; therefore, we consider the EZC as 02 
May 2010-16 February 2012. 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the CSAD measure and the market return 
for each of the eleven markets. As we noted before that we consider only the active 
stocks in our sample, which include liquid firms and the number of firms listed in 
the selected indices for the eleven markets ranges from 20 to 45 firms. The statistics 
presented in table 1 show that the average CSAD is higher in Ireland, Greece and 
Norway as compared to other countries. Similarly, the standard deviations of CSAD 
for these countries are higher than for the others. Chiang and Zheng (2010) stress, in 
this context, that a higher standard deviation in similar markets may suggest that the 
markets had unusual cross-sectional variations due to unexpected news or shocks; 
otherwise, the rest of the countries’ average CSADs are close to each other. As 
expected, we observe that continental Europe (France and Germany) and the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) have similar means and standard 
deviations, except Norway. This finding leads us to test whether countries of the 
same group have different types of herd behavior. Among the PIIGS countries, 
Greece and Ireland have higher average CSAD values compared to Italy, Portugal 
and Spain, and this gives the impression that the former countries might have 
herding given asymmetric market conditions. 
4. Empirical Results 
This section presents the main results concerning hypotheses ‘H1-H4’.  
4.1 Herding Behavior in Europe for the Overall Sample 
The first set of results, which we present in Table 2, corresponds to the base model 
Eq. (2). The results are estimated for each market for the whole sample period 
(January 2001 to February 2012).  
 
 18 
Table 2 about here 
 
Initially, from Table 2 we observe that in each country, the results show significantly 
positive coefficients on the linear term 

Rm,t  for all countries, which confirms that the 
cross-sectional absolute dispersion (CSAD) of returns increases with the magnitude 
of the market return.  However, the squared market returns in the models allow us to 
test whether the cross-sectional dispersion increases at a decreasing rate during 
extreme market movements. When analyzing coefficient 

 2 for the squared market 
return, the results indicate that the coefficient is significantly negative for Finland at 
the 10% level accepting the null hypothesis of no difference in herd behavior among 
the country groups during the entire sample period (H1). We find such evidence but 
it is only significant (weakly) in the case of Finland from the Nordic group. We do 
not observe any herding effect for the continental and the PIIGS European countries 
during the entire sample period and hence, accept the alternative hypothesis that 
similar country groups have similar herding behavior. At the same time, however, 
for the Nordic group we find different herding behavior within a similar country 
group. The reason that we did not find any negatively significant herding coefficient 
for the rest of the countries might be due to the sample we have taken for the most 
liquid indices rather than all sector price indices. However, our study is able to 
capture the herding issues related to liquidity constraints and focus more on crises 
and other stress related aspects rigorously. Nevertheless, the extended model by 
Chiang and Zhang (2010), which were originally developed by CCK, is presented in 
model 2, offer consistent results. 
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4.2 Herding Behavior under Different Market Conditions 
We use three sub-hypotheses (H2a, H2b, and H2c) to test H2. This hypothesis 
investigates the herd behavior around market asymmetry. The next set of results that 
we report in Tables 3, 4 and 5 investigates whether there is any significant herding 
during asymmetric market conditions of rising and falling markets (Table 3), during 
higher and lower volume (Table 4) and higher and lower volatility (Table 5), 
respectively. We also run the Wald test of coefficient diagnostics testing to check 
whether the coefficients are equal under asymmetric conditions in each case. The 
rejection of the Wald test confirms the described asymmetry. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
We find (Table 3) that the herding coefficient dummy for the negative returns (1-
D[up])Rm,t2 becomes significant for the markets in Portugal, Greece, Sweden and 
Germany during negative returns suggesting that herding behavior is much more 
likely to be encountered on days of negative returns. Moreover, the Wald test,10 
which also suggests that the null of no difference in herding coefficients between 
positive and negative returns is rejected. It is interesting to see that the benchmark 
model for the German market, when we considered the market asymmetry of the 
down market, is reversed suggesting a strong herding effect relating to market 
conditions. This result supports the conclusion of McQueen et al. (1996) that in down 
markets increased betas across many stocks would lead to increased pairwise stock 
correlation and would result in CSAD decreasing. Moreover, this might be explained 
                                                        
10 We use the Wald test as a robustness check for the herding coefficient between positive and negative returns, 
high and low volumes and volatility. 
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with the behavioral aspect of investors during stress or panic. This could be also due 
to rational herding for the institutional investors due to a potential loss of reputation.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 4 presents the herding coefficients during high and low volume, where we 
consider a 30 day moving average to calculate the high and low volume dummy in a 
similar approach to Economou et al. (2011). We find that only Ireland and Norway 
have a significant herding effect (1-D(vol-High)Rmt2) during low volume trading 
periods, which is further confirmed by the Wald test that the asymmetry effect in 
terms of high and low volume market condition – this rejects the hypothesis of an 
equality of herding coefficients. It is worth mentioning that we find a high average 
cross sectional dispersion of returns in those markets (see Table 1). This source of 
asymmetry in herding under different market condition might be the outcome from 
portfolio managers’ response to investors’ behavior during extreme market events. 
 
Table 5 about here 
Table 5 presents herding behavior during high and low volatility periods calculated 
in the same way as the volume dummy using 30 day moving averages. We observe a 
significant herding coefficient D[2-High] (Rmt)2 in Greece,  Sweden and Denmark 
during high and low volatility periods. This finding is confirmed by the results of the 
Wald test, which rejects the hypothesis of an equality of herding coefficients.   
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A question that might be raised is why some of the European markets do not have 
herding under asymmetric conditions while others do? Herding coefficients during 
asymmetric market conditions in some countries might be due to panic or 
overreaction and the result of noise trading by the participants of the markets during 
crises. However, this asymmetric impact of negative market returns, volume and 
volatility is supported by a series of existing studies (e.g., Christie and Haung, 1995; 
Chang et al., 2000; Gleason et al., 2004; Demirer et al., 2006; and Chiang and Zheng, 
2010) that have argued that herding effects are expected to be more pronounced 
during periods of market losses with respect to trading volume and volatility. These 
studies stress that the human behavioral tendency to herd becomes stronger during 
periods of abnormal information flows, market losses and volatility since investors 
seek the comfort of the consensus opinions (Economou et al., 2011).  
 
4.3 The Cross-country Herding Effect and the Influence of Regional Markets 
Post the establishment of the European Union, European countries has become well 
integrated through cross border trade, common creditors and cross listings. It is, 
therefore, worth testing whether herding forces synchronized across these markets. 
Economou et al. (2011) observes a cross-country herding effect within the PIGS 
countries. Chiang et al. (2007) document that contagion effects spread financial risk 
across markets, and herding activity further exacerbates market crises. 
We attempt to investigate further how this cross-country herding effect impacts on 
the different country groups in our sample. We expect that the Continental and 
Nordic Europe’s open market economies are potentially subject to contagion effects 
from the PIIGS markets due to bilateral trade and payoffs. The correlation in cross 
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sectional deviation of market returns may be due to geographic proximity that 
produces close trading relation in the region or to a similar cultural background. To 
investigate the integration of CSAD, we also consider the role and significance of 
common factors by including the German foreign influence for each cross sectional 
integration analysis of the cross sectional standard deviation of returns (see Table 6). 
We find a positive and highly significant CSAD coefficient across all markets 
suggesting a dominant influence of German market dispersions in all the European 
markets. In particular, France, Norway, Sweden, Greece and Italy show more 
significant herding around the German market. This might be due to the fact that any 
shockwave in a similar industry firms tends to transmit across borders. We also 
observe negative coefficients of the German market (GermanRmt2) with most of the 
markets except Portugal and Ireland. The significantly negative value may imply that 
herding formation for each European market is influenced by German market 
conditions. 
 
Table 6 about here 
We estimate cross-country herding behavior including UK return and US lag returns 
along with eleven sample countries’ CSAD. The results are reported in Table 7. We 
find overwhelming evidence that the cross sectional dispersions of returns can be 
partly explained by the cross sectional dispersions of the other markets. The 
regression results show whether the cross-sectional dispersion in each market is 
affected by the measure of dispersion in the other markets.  The regression results 
indicate that 58 country coefficients are statistically significant out of 110 cross-
country coefficients, which means that common herding forces exist across a great 
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number of markets in Europe. The results suggest a superior explanatory power of 
this extended model as compared to the base model when we compare the adj. R2 in 
both models. The average adj. R2 refers that cross-country influence of cross sectional 
deviation of returns is lower in the markets of the PIIGS (32.5%) compared to the 
continental (43%) and Nordic countries (48%). The highest adj. R2 is in France (56.5%) 
followed by Norway (54.8%), and Sweden (45.8%). This finding could be due to the 
contagion effect among the country groups in our sample. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
However, similar to Economou et al. (2011), in most of the cases, we find a strongly 
positive significant relationship between the CSAD measures among the markets. 
We find that the cross sectional dispersions of returns is influenced by both similar 
and different market groups. For example, we observe that Greece market’s CSAD is 
influenced by the rest of the PIIGS markets, most of the Nordic markets except 
Denmark as well as by the continental markets. The French market’s CSAD is 
influenced by most of the PIIGS sample except Spain, but none of the Nordic markets 
are influenced the French market’s CSAD. In short, we observe a strong influence of 
CSAD from one to the other country groups, which accepts the alternative 
hypothesis H3 that there is significant cross-country herding effect within the country 
groups.   
 
4.4 Herding Effects during Turbulent Periods 
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Chiang and Zheng (2010) show the impact of different crises on herding coefficients, 
including both advanced and emerging markets. They have included the impact of 
Asian, Mexican, Argentinian and subprime credit crises. However, they found that in 
most of the cases there are no differences in herding coefficients during crisis and 
tranquil periods, except for the US and Latin America. Unlike Chiang and Zheng 
(2010), but similar to Economou et al. (2011), we used the crises dummies instead of 
sub-sampling the period. The empirical evidence of this study (Table 8) reports 
significant herding coefficients during the global financial crisis in the continental 
and the PIIGS markets as compared to the Nordic markets. However, the Nordic 
markets’ herding coefficients of EZC are more significant as compared to the GFC. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
For countries like France, Italy and Spain, there is no presence of herding under the 
benchmark model and asymmetric models (Eqs. 2-5). However, in the augmented 
benchmark model with a crisis dummy (Eq. 7), we find that the dispersion of returns 
of those markets is significantly and negatively affected by the GFC period. We also 
find evidence of herd behavior during the GFC in the Nordic market and this implies 
that the cross-sectional dispersion of return decreased during the crisis. Finally, 
during the EZC period, the countries characterized by the presence of herd behavior 
include Norway, Denmark, and Sweden from the Nordic markets and Greece and 
Spain from the PIIGS markets. Essentially, Nordic markets are primarily affected 
during the EZC, but continental and the PIIGS are primarily affected during the 
GFC.  
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Our findings11 on the continental European sample, which include firm-level data, 
do not support the findings of Chiang and Zheng (2010). They consider all firms 
industry indices and report the ongoing presence of herd behavior in France, 
Germany and the UK. We find evidence of herd behavior in those countries only 
during the crises. However, our study supports their view that herding effects are 
present in the developed markets despite the fact that we have a different sample. 
Further, our study supports the finding of Economou et al. (2011) that herd behavior 
is more prominent during crisis (GFC) in the PIGS countries. Our study supports the 
findings of Economou et al. (2011) and Holmes et al. (2013) that the herd behavior 
persists in Portugal, but this is true only during negative market returns. Our study 
is different from Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Economou et al. (2011) in that we 
investigate the cross-country herding among developed Europe during the GFC and 
EZC with a new data set with a sample period that fully captures GFC or EZC.  
Finally, given the criticism of applying the CCK model, Chiang et al. (forthcoming) 
provide details that during the crisis period, the herding coefficient can be 
endogenous to the market conditions, including the change of market volatility. As a 
result, the interacting term of variance and market return can be significant, leading 
to a specification error if we use the original model by Chang et al. (2000) in testing 
herding. As a robustness checking, we used the analysis developed by Chiang and 
Zheng (2010) including the addition of Rmt (market portfolio return) to the right 
hand side of the estimation equation. This specification permits us to take care of the 
asymmetric investor behavior under different market conditions. The results are 
                                                        
11 We also try value-weighted data and additionally include US lagged market returns as a global factor in the 
regression estimates, but the results do not change significantly. 
 26 
presented in Tables 2 and 7 only for the overall market sample with and without 
crises12. However, we find consistent results between the CCK models and Chiang 
and Zheng, (2010) extended model.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates herd behavior among European markets (e.g. continental, 
Nordic and the PIIGS) for a period including the GFC and EZC. The comparative 
country-wise analysis of herd behavior among European countries suggests that 
herding is not significant in Europe during normal times, but is significant during 
crises and in regimes of different extreme market conditions. We observe significant 
herding coefficients during asymmetric market conditions and crises periods, but 
these differ among the country groups. The study also concludes that common 
herding forces exist across a large number of markets in Europe, and they are highly 
related within similar types of markets.  
An interesting finding of the study concerning herd behavior in the European stock 
markets is that the continental and the PIIGS markets are more intensely affected by 
the global financial crisis and the Nordic markets are more affected by the Eurozone 
crisis than the global financial crisis. This might be the outcome of bailout policies 
and capital injection in the PIIGS markets during Eurozone crisis. The policy makers 
of the European Union need to consider the challenge of financial instability and the 
contagion effect of the PIIGS on developed European markets, especially continental 
Europe and Nordic countries. The convergence of trading strategies has important 
                                                        
12 We did not present the results of different market conditions due to limited space but are available on request. 
 27 
consequences for stock market efficiency because herding might systematically 
misprice financial assets and promote the creation of asset bubbles. 
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Figure 1: Clustering Analysis of Three Country Groups using CSAD and Rm  
The figure below presents Dandrograms of CSAD and Rm for the eleven countries in the sample. CSAD is the daily cross-sectional absolute deviation and Rm is the daily market return.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics:  
  
Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
  Portugal Italy   Ireland   Greece   Spain   Finland   Norway   Sweden Denmark   France   Germany   
  CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm CSAD Rm 
Mean 0.556 -0.017 0.402 -0.014 0.712 -0.014 0.790 -0.046 0.420 0.012 0.501 0.021 0.836 0.010 0.546 0.022 0.507 0.016 0.456 -0.011 0.503 0.002 
Median 0.430 0.034 0.298 0.045 0.533 0.026 0.570 0.000 0.326 0.051 0.383 0.042 0.631 0.074 0.403 0.015 0.381 0.015 0.337 0.025 0.372 0.062 
Maximum 3.673 11.326 3.062 9.541 6.782 6.700 8.727 12.643 3.498 10.053 4.175 8.920 7.526 11.940 4.233 9.781 4.206 9.253 3.915 10.694 5.217 11.786 
Minimum 0.000 -9.254 0.000 -7.625 0.000 -9.176 0.000 -13.173 0.000 -7.827 0.000 -8.951 0.001 -11.717 0.000 -8.069 0.000 -10.452 0.001 -9.911 0.000 -8.397 
Std. deviation 0.499 1.125 0.384 1.338 0.676 1.108 0.789 1.574 0.381 1.315 0.458 1.432 0.807 1.877 0.522 1.584 0.478 1.295 0.445 1.588 0.482 1.464 
N 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 
 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of daily cross-sectional absolute deviations (CSAD) and daily market returns (Rm) for eleven sample countries for the period 
2001-2012.   
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Table 2: Regression Estimates of Herding Behavior: 
Model 1 Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
Variable Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain Finland Norway Sweden Denmark France Germany 
Constant 
0.388*** 0.225*** 0.466*** 0.392*** 0.274*** 0.269*** 0.318*** 0.239*** 
 
0.330***. 0.168*** 0.276*** 
 
(26.80) (18.53) (19.06) (17.04) (25.35) (19.14) (16.22) (15.04) (24.02) (15.70) (19.76) 
Rmt 0.229*** 0.186*** 0.300*** 0.346*** 0.162*** 0.255*** 0.385*** 0.030*** 0.205*** 0.262*** 0.002 
 
(9.93) (7.47) (5.77) (11.04) (10.05) (10.82) (13.58) (3.63) (9.66) (14.07) (0.26) 
Rmt2 -0.0013 0.0025 0.0135 0.011 0.0004 -0.0086* 0.0054 0.289 0.0048 -0.005 0.2089*** 
 
(-0.30) (0.35) (0.81) (1.45) (0.12) (-1.94) (1.12) (1.00) (-0.33) (-0.07) (9.04) 
Adj. R² 0.145 0.248 0.173 0.347 0.170 0.249 0.498 0.361 0.156 0.465 0.321 
Model 2 Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
Variable Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain Finland Norway Sweden Denmark France Germany 
Constant 0.389*** 0.227*** 0.467*** 0.393*** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.318*** 0.239*** 0.330*** 0.168*** 0.277*** 
 
(26.70) (18.71) (19.09) (17.16) (25.17) (18.99) (16.21) (15.04) (24.06) (15.57) (19.77) 
Rmt -0.008 -0.007 0.0106 -0.002 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.030*** 0.005 0.015** 0.002 
 
(-0.06) (-0.86) (0.68) (-0.21) (0.62) (1.54) (0.82) (3.64) (0.50) (2.26) (0.26) 
Rmt 0.229*** 0.185*** 0.298*** 0.346*** 0.163*** 0.259*** 0.384*** 0.289*** 0.204*** 0.266*** 0.209*** 
 
(9.73) (7.56) (5.77) (11.02) (9.89) (11.10) (13.76) (10.01) (9.69) (14.34) (9.05) 
Rmt2 -0.001 0.002 0.015 0.011 
 
0.003 -0.009* 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.009* 
 
(-0.28) (0.37) (0.90) 
 
(1.41) (0.08) (-1.84) (1.25) (-0.50) (-0.30) (-0.09) (1.91) 
Adj. R² 0.145 0.248 0.173 0.346 0.170 0.250 0.499 0.360 0.156 0.467 0.321 
 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for the benchmark model Eq. (2). The sample period is January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West (1987) correction is 
applied to estimate standard errors. The T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. We employ the 
extended model by Chiang and Zheng (2010), which was originally developed by Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000: CCK). Model 1 represents the CCK(2000) considering 
only absolute market return in the right hand side of the equation and model 2 represents Chiang and Zheng’s, (2010) extended model including market return in the right 
hand side of the equation. Model 2 is employed for robustness checks. 
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Table 3: Regression Estimates of Herding Behavior in Rising and Declining Markets: 
 Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
 PORTUGAL  ITALY  IRELAND  GREECE  SPAIN  FINLAND  NORWAY  SWEDEN  DENMARK  FRANCE  GERMANY 
Constant 
0.345*** 
(23.62) 
0.296*** 
(23.37) 
0.439*** 
(23.00) 
0.552*** 
(21.06) 
0.315*** 
(27.47) 
0.338*** 
(23.96) 
0.630*** 
(24.90) 
0.360*** 
(19.77) 
0.371*** 
(24.12) 
0.268*** 
(20.10) 
0.355*** 
(22.75) 
D[up](Rmt) 
0.233*** 
(7.94) 
0.101*** 
(4.57) 
0.292*** 
(7.02) 
0.337*** 
(7.03) 
0.092*** 
(4.346) 
0.228*** 
(6.69) 
0.218*** 
(3.43) 
0.245*** 
(5.56) 
0.178*** 
(5.75) 
0.225*** 
(6.22) 
0.101*** 
(2.97) 
(1-D[up])(Rmt) 
0.320*** 
(10.87) 
0.1487*** 
(4.84) 
0.351*** 
(7.43) 
0.338*** 
(6.50) 
0.163*** 
(7.20) 
0.230*** 
(8.87) 
0.239*** 
(4.45) 
0.274*** 
(8.55) 
0.194*** 
(5.54) 
0.247*** 
(8.21) 
0.240*** 
(7.57) 
D[up]Rm,t2 
0.008 
(0.85) 
0.006 
(1.37) 
0.035** 
(2.54) 
-0.019 
(-1.54) 
0.012* 
(1.89) 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
0.009 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.15) 
-0.007 
(-0.77) 
0.008 
(0.80) 
0.029*** 
(2.65) 
(1-D[up])Rm,t2 
-0.024*** 
(-3.25) 
0.0006 
(0.06) 
-0.010 
(-0.73) 
-0.028* 
(-1.67) 
-0.007 
(-1.39) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.42) 
0.019 
(1.48) 
-0.032*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.013 
(-1.43) 
-0.0098 
(-1.38) 
-0.012* 
(-1.68) 
Adj. R2 0.184 0.249 0.226 0.347 0.172 0.251 0.499 0.366 0.162 0.469 0.321 
4-5 0.032  0.005  0.045  0.009  0.019  0.011 -0.010  0.034  0.006  0.018  0.041 
            
Wald test of Chi-
square 7.681*** 2.647  1.060 6.305*** 7.769**  2.275 2.448  15.905*** 0.225  3.572  22.031*** 
 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for the model described in Equation (3). The sample period is between January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West (1987) 
correction is applied to estimate standard errors and T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. D[up] 
is dummy variable for the up market and (1-D[up]) is dummy variable for the down market. 4-5 represents a Wald test of the significant difference of coefficients between up 
and down markets with respect to squared market return. 
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Table 4: Regression Estimates of Herding Behavior on days of High and Low Trading Volume:  
 Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
 PORTUGAL ITALY IRELAND GREECE SPAIN FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY 
Constant 
0.347*** 
(22.53) 
0.297*** 
(23.14) 
0.454*** 
(23.14) 
0.560*** 
(20.63) 
0.315*** 
(25.98) 
0.341*** 
(23.73) 
0.647*** 
(27.33) 
0.366*** 
(20.30) 
0.373*** 
(24.13) 
0.270*** 
(20.61) 
0.353*** 
(21.03) 
D[Vol-High](Rm,t) 
0.294*** 
(9.30) 
0.136*** 
(5.67) 
0.301*** 
(7.04) 
0.327*** 
(6.95) 
0.137*** 
(5.74) 
0.232*** 
(8.07) 
0.260*** 
(5.32) 
0.277*** 
(7.39) 
0.198*** 
(6.20) 
0.224*** 
(6.52) 
0.171*** 
(4.75) 
(1-D[Vol-High])(Rm,t) 
0.244*** 
(6.95) 
0.099*** 
(3.32) 
0.252*** 
(5.92) 
0.299*** 
(4.37) 
0.116*** 
(4.45) 
0.221*** 
(7.29) 
0.079 
(1.64) 
0.214*** 
(4.91) 
0.160*** 
(4.58) 
0.239*** 
(7.18) 
0.170*** 
(3.96) 
D[Vol-High]Rmt2 
-0.011 
(-1.49) 
0.0008 
(0.15) 
0.005 
(0.47) 
-.0280*** 
(-2.68) 
0.0006 
(0.12) 
-.017*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.020* 
(-1.77) 
-0.013* 
(-1.78) 
-0.0005 
(-0.06) 
0.008 
(0.8611) 
(1-D[Vol-High])Rmt2 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
0.013 
(1.43) 
-0.051*** 
-(3.78) 
-0.0001 
(-0.003) 
0.003 
(0.29) 
-0.016* 
(-1.71) 
-0.082*** 
-(5.50) 
-0.008 
(-0.60) 
-0.003 
(-0.23) 
0.0007 
(0.07) 
0.007 
(0.47) 
Adj. R2 0.180 0.235 0.224 0.336 0.163 0.231 0.521 0.345 0.154 0.434 0.312 
4-5 -0.009 -0.01253 .056 -0.027 -0.0024 -0.0008 0.081 -0.012 -0.010 -0.001 0.001 
Wald test of Chi-square 2.407 1.932 12.479*** 1.251 0.946 0.242 17.764*** 2.748 1.152 0.721 0.027 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for the model described in Eq. (4). The sample period is between January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West (1987) 
correction is applied to estimate standard errors and t-Statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. D [Vol-
High] refers to a dummy for high volume market condition; (1-D [Vol-High]) refers to a dummy for low volume market condition. 4-5 represents a Wald test of the 
significant difference of coefficients between high and low volume market conditions with respect to the squared market return. 
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Table 5: Regression Estimates of Herding Behavior on days of High and Low Volatility:  
 
 Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
 PORTUGAL ITALY IRELAND GREECE SPAIN FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY 
Constant 
0.345*** 
(22.55) 
0.294*** 
(23.45) 
0.432*** 
(21.29) 
0.548*** 
(21.00) 
0.313*** 
(26.90) 
0.341*** 
(24.20) 
0.624*** 
(23.94) 
0.361*** 
(19.85) 
0.368*** 
(24.22) 
0.268*** 
(20.03) 
0.353*** 
(21.82) 
D[2-High](Rmt) 
0.312*** 
(7.06) 
0.139*** 
(5.10) 
0.392*** 
(7.33) 
0.396*** 
(6.21) 
0.183*** 
(6.57) 
0.227*** 
(5.55) 
0.287*** 
(4.07) 
0.288*** 
(6.82) 
0.248*** 
(6.34) 
0.242*** 
(5.99) 
0.214*** 
(5.80) 
(1-D[2-High])(Rmt) 
0.259*** 
(9.46) 
0.121*** 
(5.09) 
0.319*** 
(7.41) 
0.328*** 
(7.59) 
0.108*** 
(5.29) 
0.225*** 
(8.41) 
0.222*** 
(4.22) 
0.250*** 
(6.88) 
0.168*** 
(6.17) 
0.234*** 
(7.62) 
0.152*** 
(4.61) 
D[2-High]Rmt2 
-0.0112 
(-0.75) 
0.003 
(0.35) 
-0.0374* 
(-2.42) 
-0.048** 
(-2.20) 
-0.007 
(-1.08) 
-0.014 
(-1.02) 
-0.003 
(-0.15) 
-0.031** 
(-2.27) 
-0.025** 
(-2.37) 
-0.007 
(-0.63) 
0.004 
(0.43) 
(1-D[2-High])Rmt2 
-0.006 
(-0.98) 
0.004 
(0.74) 
0.018 
 (1.41) 
-0.019 
(-1.61) 
0.005 
(0.92) 
-0.017** 
(-2.42) 
0.018 
(1.15) 
-0.013 
(-1.60) 
-0.007 
(-1.59) 
-0.0004 
(-0.05) 
0.011 
(1.09) 
Adj. R2 0.177 0.223 0.225 0.342 0.172 0.223 0.501 0.321 0.175 0.442 0.312 
4-5 -0.005 -0.001 -0.055 -0.029 -0.012 0.003 -0.021 -0.018 -0.018 -0.007 -0.007 
Wald test of Chi-square 2.929 0.740 1.898 11.335*** 2.166 0.083 1.513 3.090* 5.504* 0.512 4.038 
 
 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for the model described in Eq. (5). The sample period is between January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West 
(1987) correction is applied to estimate the standard errors and t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level. D [2-High] refers to a dummy for the high volatility market condition; (1-D [2-High]) refers to a dummy for the low volatility market 
condition. 4-5 represents a Wald test of the significant difference of coefficients between high and low volatility market conditions with respect to squared 
market return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
Table 6: The Influence of the German Market on Cross-country Herding: 
 
VARIABLES 
Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal. Italy. Ireland. Greece. Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
 
PORTUGAL IRELAND ITALY GREECE SPAIN FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN DENMARK FRANCE 
Constant 
0.353*** 
(19.23) 
0.399*** 
(12.87) 
0.178*** 
(14.38) 
0.272*** 
(9.24) 
0.219*** 
(16.27) 
0.219*** 
(16.31) 
0.232*** 
(9.67) 
0.195*** 
(12.22) 
0.276*** 
(17.44) 
0.0950*** 
(8.00) 
Rmt 
-0.0019 
(-0.13) 
0.0241 
(1.44) 
-0.0053 
(-0.70) 
0.0010 
(0.09) 
0.0048 
(0.64) 
0.0134* 
(1.75) 
0.0129 
(1.47) 
0.0249*** 
(3.05) 
0.0072 
(0.78) 
0.0137** 
(2.09) 
|Rmt| 
0.2027*** 
(7.81) 
0.2208*** 
(3.46) 
0.1652*** 
(6.36) 
0.3334*** 
(10.81) 
0.1457*** 
(9.56) 
0.2396*** 
(10.52) 
0.3811*** 
(14.64) 
0.2488*** 
(10.47) 
0.1892*** 
(9.04) 
0.2215*** 
(10.11) 
Rmt2 
-0.0091* 
(-1.67) 
0.0108 
(0.48) 
0.0166 
(1.59) 
0.0120* 
(1.72) 
0.0082* 
(1.72) 
-0.001* 
(-1.67) 
0.0150*** 
(2.80) 
0.0260*** 
(3.40) 
0.0042 
(0.82) 
0.0194* 
(1.95) 
GERMANCSAD 
0.0753*** 
(2.64) 
0.1294*** 
(2.98) 
0.1510*** 
(5.72) 
0.3242*** 
(5.97) 
0.1551*** 
(6.24) 
0.1495*** 
(6.40) 
0.2584*** 
(6.86) 
0.1877*** 
(6.19) 
0.1549*** 
(5.51) 
0.2462*** 
(7.64) 
GERMAN Rmt2 
0.0126*** 
(3.41) 
0.0314*** 
(6.29) 
-0.0156*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0156** 
(-2.10) 
-0.0102*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0122** 
(-2.53) 
-0.0335*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.0377*** 
(-7.68) 
-0.0089*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.0247*** 
(-3.27) 
Adj. R2 0.174 0.277 0.282 0.375 0.197 0.269 0.536 0.425 0.173 0.520 
 
Note: The table reports the influence of Germany on the cross-country herding for the period of January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West (1987) correction is 
applied to estimate standard errors and t-Statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 7: Regression Estimates of Cross-country Herding:  
 
 
Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
Variables 
PORTUGAL IRELAND ITALY GREECE SPAIN DENMARK FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN FRANCE GERMANY 
Constant 
0.234*** 
(10.38) 
0.183*** 
(5.32) 
0.076*** 
(4.63) 
-8.59E 
(-0.002) 
0.146*** 
(8.99) 
0.190*** 
(8.91) 
0.131*** 
(7.43) 
0.230*** 
(7.49) 
0.136*** 
(6.01) 
0.066*** 
(4.72) 
0.140*** 
(6.26) 
|Rmt| 
0.145*** 
(5.55) 
0.174*** 
(3.22) 
0.114*** 
(4.69) 
0.313*** 
(11.06) 
0.095*** 
(5.95) 
0.138*** 
(6.78) 
0.176*** 
(6.90) 
0.371*** 
(12.19) 
0.193*** 
(8.58) 
0.176*** 
(8.20) 
0.118*** 
(5.46) 
 Rmt2 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.014 
(0.72) 
0.021** 
(2.30) 
0.013** 
(2.19)) 
0.020*** 
(4.01) 
0.012** 
(2.24) 
-0.008*** 
(2.85) 
0.018** 
(2.24) 
0.039*** 
(6.57) 
0.035*** 
(3.46) 
0.025*** 
(5.59) 
PORTUGALCSAD  
0.047 
(1.58) 
0.012 
(0.76) 
-0.110*** 
(-3.31) 
0.011 
(0.64) 
-0.011 
(-0.44) 
0.032 
(1.52) 
-0.059** 
(-1.99) 
-0.029 
(-1.45) 
-0.043*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.018 
(-0.82) 
IRELANDCSAD 
0.040** 
(2.36)  
0.012 
(0.89) 
-0.072*** 
(-2.60) 
0.024* 
(1.78) 
0.004 
(0.22) 
0.007 
(0.38) 
-0.038* 
(-1.66) 
0.005 
(0.36) 
0.033*** 
(2.65) 
0.008 
(0.40) 
ITALYCSAD 
0.078** 
(2.36) 
0.123*** 
(2.98)  
0.151*** 
(3.38) 
0.107*** 
(4.57) 
0.101*** 
(3.43) 
0.008 
(0.32) 
0.039 
(0.80) 
0.025 
(0.81) 
0.085*** 
(3.78) 
0.049* 
(1.63) 
GREECECSAD 
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.008 
(0.43) 
0.072*** 
(6.51)  
0.082*** 
(6.26) 
0.010 
(0.58) 
0.062*** 
(4.38) 
0.030* 
(1.69) 
0.062*** 
(4.05) 
0.091*** 
(8.96) 
0.058*** 
(3.56) 
SPAINCSAD 
0.021 
(0.66) 
0.078** 
(2.06) 
0.098*** 
(4.19) 
0.177*** 
(3.97)  
-0.006 
(-0.18) 
0.013 
(0.468) 
 
-0.066 
(-1.54) 
0.040 
(1.47) 
-0.017 
(-0.78) 
0.056** 
(2.15) 
DENMARKCSAD 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.025 
(0.94) 
0.050*** 
(2.86) 
-0.038 
(-1.23) 
-0.009 
(-0.47)  
0.062*** 
(3.09) 
0.105*** 
(3.59) 
0.073*** 
(3.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.041* 
(1.89) 
FINLANDCSAD 
0.087*** 
(3.53) 
0.074** 
(2.23) 
-0.026 
(-1.59) 
0.181*** 
(5.68) 
0.006 
(0.29) 
0.080*** 
(3.49)  
-0.050 
(-1.56) 
0.057** 
(2.54) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
NORWAYCSAD 
0.036** 
(2.173) 
0.030* 
(1.612) 
0.029*** 
(2.554) 
0.047** 
(2.118) 
-0.00256 
(-0.250) 
0.023* 
(1.698) 
-0.009 
(-0.672)  
0.012 
(0.918) 
-0.012 
(-1.150) 
0.049*** 
(3.259) 
SWEDENCSAD 
0.061** 
(2.27) 
0.063** 
(2.20) 
0.010 
(0.61) 
0.184*** 
(5.54) 
0.029 
(1.58) 
0.060*** 
(2.66) 
0.065*** 
(3.23) 
0.033 
(1.16)  
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.16) 
FRANCECSAD 
0.036 
(1.06) 
0.250*** 
(6.07) 
0.063*** 
(2.83) 
0.425*** 
(9.21) 
-0.004 
(-0.16) 
0.047 
(1.25) 
0.090*** 
(2.84) 
0.076* 
(1.72) 
-0.007 
(-0.32  
0.143*** 
(5.67) 
GERMANCSAD 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.007 
(0.17) 
0.072*** 
(2.78) 
0.131*** 
(2.63) 
0.071*** 
(3.42) 
0.080*** 
(2.83) 
0.060 
(2.53) 
0.191*** 
(4.97) 
0.109*** 
(3.48) 
0.193*** 
(5.99) - 
GERMANRMSQR 
0.013*** 
(3.27) 
0.021*** 
(3.01) 
-0.014*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.017* 
(-1.95) 
-0.005 
(-1.14) 
-0.006* 
(-1.63) 
-0.007 
(-1.55) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.028*** 
(-4.65) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.00) - 
UKRETSQR 
-0.008** 
(-2.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.004 
(-1.45) 
-0.011* 
(-1.61) 
-0.014*** 
(-5.88) 
-0.009** 
(-2.36) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.014 
(-1.49) 
-0.018*** 
(-5.32) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.017*** 
(-5.85) 
USLAGRETSQR 
0.005*** 
(2.58) 
-0.003 
(-1.28) 
0.002 
(0.63) 
-0.004 
(-1.50) 
0.010*** 
(5.92) 
0.007* 
(1.84) 
0.004* 
(1.75) 
0.007 
(1.47) 
0.006*** 
(2.57) 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.010*** 
(4.65) 
Adj. R2  
0.207 0.327 
 
0.336 
 
0.481 0.275 0.206 0.316 0.548 0.458 0.565 0.396 
 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for the model described in Eq. (6). The sample period is for the period of January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West (1987) 
correction is applied to estimate standard errors and t-statistics are given in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. We use 
two additional control variables to capture the global factors, e.g. UKRETSQR (Squared UK returns) and USLAGRETSQR (Squared US lagged returns). 
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Table 8: Results of Regression Estimates of Herding Behavior for the GFC and EZC:  
Model 1 Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
Variable 
Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain Finland Norway Sweden Denmark France Germany 
Constant 
0.379*** 0.230*** 0.476*** 0.418*** 0.286*** 0.269*** 0.308*** 0.257*** 0.335*** 0.188*** 0.291*** 
 
(23.84) (21.27) (19.45) (17.97) (26.16) (19.74) (17.23) (18.64) (22.38) (17.44) (21.16) 
|Rmt| 
0.289*** 0.171*** 0.269*** 0.256*** 0.106*** 0.263*** 0.431*** 0.243*** 0.171*** 0.220*** 0.187*** 
 
(4.56) (8.51) (5.22) (6.66) (4.77) (11.59) (15.59) (9.41) (4.40) (8.17) (6.47) 
Rmt2 
-0.0312 0.0191**** 0.0286 0.0455*** 0.0237*** -0.0201* 0.0153*** 0.0246*** 0.0297* 0.0335*** 0.0291*** 
 
(-0.84) (3.00) (1.39) (4.14) (3.65) (-1.82) (2.85) (3.70) (1.79) (3.49) (3.63) 
GFC- Rmt2 
0.0303 -0.0253*** -0.0159 -0.0416*** -0.0233*** 0.0076 -0.0095 -0.0315*** -0.0284* -0.0299*** -0.0198** 
 
(0.81) (-4.56) (-1.00) (-2.69) (-3.23) (0.80) (-1.36) (-2.82) (-1.68) (-3.05) (-2.19) 
EZC -Rmt2 
0.0330 -0.0085 0.0132 -0.0353** -0.0204*** -0.0176* -0.0228* -0.0347*** -0.0627*** -0.0319*** -0.096* 
 
(0.87) (-1.27) (0.73) (-2.25) (-2.61) (1.82) (-1.92) (-3.27) (-3.44) (-2.58) (-1.67) 
Adj. R2 
0.145 0.265 0.176 0.376 0.177 0.253 0.527 0.377 0.169 0.511 0.337 
Model 2 
Panel A: PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) Panel B: Nordic Europe Panel C: Continental 
Variable 
Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain Finland Norway Sweden Denmark France Germany 
Constant 
0.389*** 0.235*** 0.485*** 0.418*** 0.285*** 0.267*** 0.308*** 0.253*** 0.335*** 0.186*** 0.291*** 
 
(27.36) (23.84) (21.52) (17.95) (26.35) (19.63) (17.28) (18.42) (22.42) (17.45) (21.65) 
Rmt 
-0.001 -0.005 0.012 -0.001 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.0310*** 0.0077 0.0136** 0.0029 
 
(-0.08) (-0.67) (0.76) (-0.09) (0.75) (1.44) (1.11) (3.76) (0.87) (2.23) (0.35) 
|Rmt| 
0.227*** 0.144*** 0.217*** 0.256*** 0.106 0.264*** 0.428*** 0.245*** 0.169*** 0.222*** 0.171** 
 
(9.15) (6.97) (4.42) (6.58) (4.78) (11.82) (15.59) (9.60) (4.32) (8.36) (7.67) 
Rmt2 
-0.003 0.026*** 0.047** 0.045*** 0.024*** -0.019* 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.031* 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 
(-0.15) (4.43) (2.30) (4.07) (3.73) (-1.78) (2.99) (3.67) (1.84) (3.53) (5.12) 
GFC- Rmt2 
0.001 -0.027*** -0.038 -0.042*** -0.024*** 0.007 -0.010 -0.033*** -0.029* -0.030*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.06) (-3.78) (-1.38) (-2.68) (-3.29) (0.72) (-1.44) (-3.10) (-1.72) (-3.15) (-4.26) 
EZC- Rmt2 0.005 -0.028*** -0.006 -0.035** -0.021*** 0.017* -0.023* -0.033*** -0.064*** -0.032** -0.025*** 
 
(0.26) (-3.05) (-0.18) (-2.17) (-2.63) (1.72) (-1.86) (-3.03178) (-3.50) (-2.53) (-3.60) 
Adj. R2 0.145 0.269 0.176 0.376 0.177 0.254 0.527 0.387 0.169 0.513 0.336 
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients for the model described in Eq. (7). The sample period is between January 2001–February 2012. Newey-West (1987) correction is applied to estimate the standard errors 
and t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. We employ the extended model by Chiang and Zheng (2010) which were developed based on the CCK 
(2000) model. Model 1 represents the CCK (2000) model considering absolute market return in the right hand side of the equation and model 2 represents Chiang and Zheng’s (2010) extended model including market 
return in the right hand side of the equation. This model is employed for robustness checks. 
